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February 17, 2021
Abstract
Why do tax rates vary so much across countries? We study the role of other-
regarding preferences and ethnic fragmentation in redistribution. A government is
elected by altruistic voters and chooses a redistributive income tax. Altruism is
directed toward social identity groups. Three main factors yield low levels of re-
distribution: (i) strong in-group altruism among rich voters—referred to as class
altruism; (ii) weak universal altruism—in particular among the rich; and (iii) ethnic
fragmentation among poor voters. We document survey evidence that the pattern
of altruism in the United States and the European Union is consistent with the
observed differences in taxes.
JEL classification: D64, D71, D72, H20.
Keywords: Altruism, Social identity, Tax rate, Redistribution, Inequality, Ethnic
fragmentation, Social classes, Probabilistic voting.
1 Introduction
The wide differences in tax rates across democracies, and particularly the low tax rates in
some advanced economies, such as the United States (US), is a long-standing puzzle. In
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a democracy the median voter, who would typically benefit from redistribution, should
determine the tax rate and the level of redistribution. This economic channel predicts a
positive correlation between pre-tax income inequality and redistribution; however, the
opposite is actually observed. In response, a vast literature has explored other ways in
which a country’s specific characteristics might affect income redistribution and there
is consensus that cross-country variation is the result of political, institutional, and be-
havioural factors.1 In this paper we explore the less-studied behavioural factors, such as
altruism and social identity, within a political economy framework.
Individual motives for redistribution are both egoistic and other-regarding. However,
most of the existing literature, including behavioural studies, mainly focused on the ego-
istic motive while extending the relevant choice set. For example, allowing preferences to
include religion or race has a significant effect on redistribution because it results in policy
bundling.2 When considering individuals with other-regarding preferences, the “others”
and how they are regarded must be specified. Following social identity theory, we let
self-identification guide the specific form of altruism. According to Akerlof and Kranton
(2000), social identity is related to the “person’s sense of self” and leads individuals to
sympathize with other individuals belonging to a social group and to exhibit altruistic
motives toward this group.3 As social identification is not exclusive to individuals of one’s
own social group, in addition to in-group altruism, we also consider identification with
the population as a whole contributing to an individual’s universal altruism.4
Our paper builds on a standard political economy framework along the lines of Persson
and Tabellini (2002) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), to which we introduce voters
with social identity and altruistic preferences. More specifically, we assume that the
altruistic motive has two components: a voter’s utility depends positively on the average
1See Alesina et al. (2001), Persson (2002), Alesina and Glaeser (2004), and Alesina and La Ferrara
(2005), for example.
2See Putterman et al. (1998), Roemer (1998), and Lee and Roemer (2006).
3See, also, the recent research using experiments—for example, Kranton et al. (2013) and the survey
by Costa-Font and Cowell (2014).
4Alesina et al. (2001) provide a good example of differential social identity when they write “a natural
generalization of the race-based theory is that Americans think of the poor as members of some different































after-tax income in the social identity group and negatively on the level of inequality in
that group.5 Furthermore, we allow for voter heterogeneity with respect to income and
ethnicity, where the latter is absent in the standard framework. Voters can group and
self-identify along any of these two dimensions, which allows us not only to analyse voting
outcomes in societies with different income classes but also study its interaction with
ethnic fragmentation.
The main results of our theoretical analysis are organized according to the different
patterns of social groups and altruism. We start by considering a society with two broad
income groups, which we refer to as social classes: the poor majority of voters and the rich
elite. We find that stronger in-group altruism, i.e., class altruism, of the rich reduces the
equilibrium tax rate as Proposition 1 will show. In contrast, stronger class altruism of the
poor, composed of traditional low- and middle-income voters, increases the tax rate. Thus,
we find that class altruism reinforces the standard political conflict over redistribution.
As a complementary result, Proposition 1 will also establish that the levels of inequality
aversion and tax rates are positively correlated in a democracy with class altruism.
Next, we consider social identification with the population as a whole captured by
universal altruism. We first explore the role of universal altruism among rich voters in
particular, and find in Proposition 2 that it leads to higher equilibrium redistribution than
when the rich are class altruistic. Furthermore, in Proposition 3 we will show that, with
sufficiently high inequality aversion, a social group’s stronger universal altruism increases
the equilibrium tax rate and therefore redistribution.
The final channel that we explore is associated with the ethnic fragmentation among
poor voters, i.e., when poor voters of a specific ethnicity self-identify with their own group.
In line with recent US Current Population Survey (CPS) data from U.S. Census Bureau
(2019), we consider a society where the share of low-income voters among the ethnic
minority (black householders) is higher than among voters of the prevalent ethnicity
(white householders) whose majority belongs to the middle-income group. Proposition 4
5A related rationale for this formulation can be found in the maximization of the social identity
group’s welfare as in Proposition 1 of Wittman (2005): altruism is overall positively associated with































will then show that, in a society with this structure, ethnic fragmentation leads to a lower
equilibrium tax rate than in societies where the poor vote united.
In the empirical section of the paper, we document direct evidence on the pattern
of altruism in the US and the European Union (EU). Considering the sixth wave of
the World Values Survey (Inglehart et al., 2014, henceforth WVS 6), we find evidence
that class altruism is stronger among rich Americans and universal altruism among rich
Europeans. Through the lens of our model, this pattern is consistent with the rich’s lower
support for redistribution in the US compared to the EU.
We also document that among poor voters, in particular in the US, the support for
income redistribution is modest. If all the poor voters were in-group altruistic, one should
observe firm support for redistribution, so we conclude that the role of universal altruism
is important in explaining the poor’s redistribution stance. This pattern of altruism is
stronger in the US, where the higher social mobility might drive the social identification
of the poor with the rich class. We also find that lower inequality aversion among poor
Americans alone could not explain the lower support for redistribution compared to the
EU.
Related Literature
The existing literature has considered mainly economic, political, and behavioural mech-
anisms to explain the differences in redistributive government policies across countries.
The main economic mechanism relies on the fact that in the median voter model, poor
voters determine the level of redistribution. However, the extent to which governments can
redistribute income is limited by distortions or economic costs associated with taxation
and redistribution. Alesina et al. (2001) find that differences between the US and Europe
are not significant in this respect, thus they cannot be the main driver for the variation
in policies.
Alesina et al. (2001) argue that redistribution may differ between Europe and the































strong courts, which prevent the growth of socialist parties and reject popular attempts
at redistribution. This explanation is more generally related to a literature that focuses
on how interest groups affect political outcomes.6 Often, an elite chooses entry barri-
ers, regulations and inefficient contracting institutions in order to protect their economic
rents.7 Another way elite minorities affect political outcomes is discussed in Acemoglu
and Robinson (2006, 2008). They adopt a probabilistic voting framework and provide
micro-political foundations (lobbying, capturing the party system, and ideology) for why
the elite may have disproportionate political power in a democracy. We introduce other-
regarding preferences to a similar probabilistic voting framework and show that it has
stark implications for the level of redistribution.
Alesina et al. (2001) argue that another possible explanation for the difference in
redistribution between the US and Europe is based on the higher political representation
of the poor in Europe and a lower general level of altruism due to racial prejudice in the
US. Similarly, introducing religion and race in voter’s preferences, as in Roemer (1998),
Lee and Roemer (2006), and Putterman et al. (1998), also affects tax levels. In contrast,
our paper explores mechanisms beyond the differences in the representation of the poor
and focuses mainly on the role of social identity and differential forms of altruism.
Our model uses altruistic preferences that go beyond the traditional uniform altruism
in standard political economy models (e.g., Smith, 1759; Becker, 1974; Arrow, 1981;
Samuelson, 1993; Sen, 1995, as cited in Fehr and Schmidt, 2006).8 In a closely related
paper, Dixit and Londregan (1998) consider how much citizens and politicians alike care
about distributive equity, and they relate this to altruism. They conclude that the voter
with the median income gains the most. However, the role of altruism has rarely been used
to study the political process—and even less so differences between class and universal
altruism. We are aware of two exceptions: (i) Widerquist (2003) applies altruism to
6See Austen-Smith (1996) for a review. For example, the elite’s ability to mobilize large groups
of voters explains the turnout in elite-driven mobilization models (e.g., Uhlaner, 1989; Morton, 1991;
Shachar and Nalebuff, 1999; Herrera and Martinelli, 2006, as cited in Evren, 2012).
7Refer to Acemoglu (2010) who cites work of Olson (1982), Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996), Parente and
Prescott (1999). See also Bandiera and Levy (2011) and Bourguignon and Verdier (2012).
8Fehr and Schmidt (2006) review the evidence gathered by experimental economists and psychologists.































analyse problems of public choice. However, unlike our approach, he considers altruistic
individuals who disagree on what the public interest is. He finds that many of the basic
problems persist no matter whether people are egoistic or other-regarding. (ii) In political
economy, Fowler and Kam (2007) extend the participation model by adding a term related
to in-group altruism, where groups are defined by political party affiliation. They show
that both universal altruism and in-group altruism increase political participation.
A recent and closely related literature adopts tractable models in which individuals
endogenously chose social identity. In this environment, induced social identity changes
can have significant effects on economic outcomes. In our paper, rather than considering
endogenous changes of social identity, we allow the characteristics of the social identity
group to be endogenous, which are affected by the policy choice. This allows us to consider
a richer political model suited to study equilibrium redistribution in the presence of income
heterogeneity and ethnic diversity. We now relate to the literature with endogenous social
identity choice in more detail.
In Shayo (2009, 2020), individuals choose both their voting action and social identity.
Social identity is chosen by trading off the gain from the identity group’s social status
and the cost of the perceived distance to the group. The political equilibrium is then
obtained via the median voter theorem. Importantly, the dissonance cost is not affected
by the equilibrium tax rate. For example, when the group characteristic is earned income,
perceived distance is not affected by the policy but solely by the given pre-tax income
inequality of the social identity group.9 Shayo’s model generates two types of social
identity equilibria: a high-tax equilibrium with self-identification among the poor and a
low-tax equilibrium where the poor identify with the nation as a whole. Lindqvist and
Östling (2013) extend Shayo’s model and let voters choose in addition self-identification
with respect to ethnicity.
The major difference of our framework to Shayo (2009, 2020) and Lindqvist and Östling
(2013) is that we endogenize the dissonance cost using inequality aversion. In our model,
9This has important implications. For example, Shayo (2009, Proposition 2) finds that the qualitative































conditional on a voter’s social identity, the utility cost from the identity group’s consump-
tion inequality is affected by the equilibrium tax rate. This allows us to also take into
account how the inequality aversion of voters affects the level of redistribution.
Grossman and Helpman (2020) adapts Shayo’s notion of a social identity equilibrium
to analyse the role of identity in trade policies. They consider three social identity groups:
the elite formed of high-skill workers, the working class with low-skill workers, and the
nation as a whole. Workers can choose to identify to their own working class or to the
nation. Individuals vote on an ad valorem tariff that increases the domestic relative price
of the import-competing good, which is more intensive in low-skill workers. In this frame-
work, changes in social identification patterns that may result from exogenous changes in
the environment (e.g., heightened racial and ethnic tensions), lead to pronounced changes
in trade policy. In our paper, we consider a different economic environment and we depart
from their analysis in the same way as we depart from Shayo (2009, 2020).
There is another strand of the political economy literature that relates identity to
redistribution, which evolved from Bénabou and Tirole (2011, 2016). In Bénabou and
Tirole (2011) individuals hold beliefs about their own attributes. The authors assume
that identity reinforces beliefs about one-self but that beliefs are formed with the desire
to improve self-image and individual welfare. Similarly, in Gennaioli and Tabellini (2019)
identity influences beliefs via group stereotypes, which are “exaggerated” group charac-
teristics. Lower class individuals believe that low class individuals have prospects, which
are below the realised value. Thus, by identifying to a low class the individuals become
too pessimistic about their social mobility, enhancing their demand for redistribution.
In contrast to our work, voters do not obtain utility from the status or equity of their
identity group.
Klor and Shayo (2010) investigate the link between identity and redistribution in
an experimental setting. They divide participants into two groups based on their field
of studies and randomly assign gross incomes. Subjects then vote anonymously over a
redistributive scheme consisting of a linear tax and a lump sum transfer. They find that































when their identity group is relatively poor even if they themselves are relatively rich—
and vice versa. Furthermore, they also document evidence that the social identification
with rich groups is stronger than with poor groups. Overall, their findings underline the
importance of modelling the social identity group’s status alongside inequality aversion
in the altruistic part of preferences.
Finally, our paper is also related to a recent literature on altruism in networks—in
particular, Bourlès et al. (2017). In their network model, altruism for directly connected
individuals motivates private transfers. In equilibrium altruism occurs in the form of “co-
operative egoism.”10 Rather than focusing on informal transfers between individuals, our
analysis considers how political competition shapes a centralized redistributive scheme.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present our model
and characterize the equilibrium tax rate. In Section 3, we analyse the effect of different
forms of altruism and social identity on the equilibrium redistribution. An attempt to
explain the dispersion of tax rates is in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. The mathematical
appendix contains all the formal proofs.
2 The model
To study conflict over income redistribution, we develop a model of political competition
with two political parties and multiple social groups, based on Persson and Tabellini (2002)
and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). The economic policy is a proportional income tax
to finance lump-sum transfers. Individuals vote according to their preferred tax rate,
ideology, and parties’ popularity in a probabilistic voting setting. Altruism plays a key
role in individual preferences as voters are altruistic towards their social identity group.
Political parties are purely office-seeking and maximize their probability of winning the
election. We now present the model, explaining its components in greater detail.

































We consider an economy populated by voters of two ethnicities e ∈ {v, w} and three
incomes yi ordered according to 0 < yl < ym < yh. This allows us to model a set of
social groups G, which can be any partition of U ≡ {v, w} × {l,m, h}. In this section we
keep the composition of social groups general, while later in Section 3 we focus on social
groups that are directly relevant for our empirical exercise.11 We assume a continuum of
voters, which we normalize to a unit measure, and denote by λe,i > 0 the share of voters










where λg is the share of voters in social group g. Since λU = 1, the average and total
income among all voters is ȳ = ȳU , and we assume that yl < ym < ȳ < yh.12 For
convenience, we will henceforth refer to voters with below-average income as the “poor”
and those with high income as the “rich”.
The political system determines a non-negative income tax rate 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1 and tax
revenues are redistributed via a lump-sum transfer T to each voter. We assume that it
is costly to raise taxes and let C(τ) denote the deadweight loss of taxation. Thus, given
that the total income in the economy is ȳ, the cost induced by a tax rate τ is given by








= [τ − C(τ)]ȳ. (1)
We assume that C(0) = 0, C ′(0) = 0, C ′(τ) > 0, ∀τ > 0, and C ′′(τ) > 0. These assump-
11Each voter belongs to exactly one social group g ∈ G. For example, if a society is composed of voters
with low, middle, or high income and ethnicity has no role, then G = {{v, w}× l, {v, w}×m, {v, w}× h}
and contains three social groups.
12This order is consistent with our empirical income categorization in Section 4, where households in
































tions imply that distortions become more salient as the tax rate increases. Furthermore,
we require C ′(1) = 1 such that increases in the tax rate eventually reduce tax revenues
due to the loss associated with distortions.
2.2 Preferences and social identity
We consider voters with altruistic preferences. Following the literature on social identity,
we assume voters of social group g are altruistic towards members of social identity group
a(g). More specifically, voters may either self-identify with their own social group, in which
case a(g) = g, or with the population as a whole, when a(g) = U . Thus, altruism is not
necessarily reciprocal between social groups, and a voters’ ethnicity and income may differ
from other members in the social identity group. To remain consistent with our empirical
application, we focus our theory on social identity with regard to ethnicity and income.
However, it would be straightforward to consider other attributes of social identification
such as religion, age, gender, or occupation in our framework. Finer categorizations of
ethnicity and income could also be considered.
In the egoistic part of preferences, voters are simply concerned with their own con-
sumption (i.e., after-tax income)
xi = (1− τ)yi + T = (1− τ)yi + [τ − C(τ)]ȳ.
In the altruistic part of preferences, following the literature on social identity, we assume
that only members of the social identity group are included. More formally, the utility
function for a voter i in group g who identifies with group a(g) is given by




, a(g) ∈ {g,U}, (2)
where Ag > 0 measures the overall strength of altruism, 0 < Eg ≤ 1/2 the strength of





































λe,ixi = (1− τ)ȳa + [τ − C(τ)]ȳ,







The particular form of the utility function, borrowed from Wittman (2005), captures
the welfare of voters in each social group. In the egoistic part, the linearity in consump-
tion is adopted for tractability and we will discuss its role for our results when necessary.
The altruistic part of utility, which incorporates status and inequality concerns, can be
interpreted as a second-order approximation to a standard welfare function for the social
identity group.14 Inequality aversion has been documented in many experiments and by
introspection, it seems plausible that an increase in the average consumption (i.e., higher
status) of a social identity group is more desirable when the consumption of all group
members, rather than that of a single individual, increases. The parameter restriction
Eg ≤ 1/2 ensures that the altruism measure increases, even when a rich voter’s income in
the social identity group increases.15 Note that there are, of course, many possible altruis-
tic functions, but Wittman’s formulation strikes a good compromise between tractability
13Shayo (2009) refers to x̄a as the social status of the identity group. He considers voters that, ce-
teris paribus, endogenously choose the social identity that minimizes the perceived distance to the fixed
attributes of a group. In contrast, we take the social identity of voters as given, but allow them to
endogenously determine the social identity group’s attributes, such as the consumption inequality Ia(x),
through policy choices.
14Consider the welfare function wa(x) = 1/λa
∑
(e,i)∈a λ
e,iu(xi), where u(xi) is a strictly increasing and
concave utility function. Ignoring irrelevant terms, a second-order Taylor approximation of wa around
xi = x∗ yields









Similar to this second-order approximation, x̄a − EgIa(x) is increasing in x̄a and decreasing in the
consumption inequality of the social identity group (just set x∗ = x̄a). However, the inequality measure
in Wittman (2005) is much more tractable.

































The preferences in (2) encompass two prominent types of altruism: in-group altruism,
where voters self-identify in-group, a(g) = g; and universal altruism, where voters are
altruistic towards the population as a whole, a(g) = U . For both types of altruism, the
indirect utility function over the tax rate can be expressed as






+(1+Ag)[τ−C(τ)]ȳ, a(g) ∈ {g,U}, (3)
where Ia(y) denotes pre-tax income inequality in the social identity group. In the absence
of altruism when voters are purely egoistic, i.e., when Ag → 0, our theory has standard im-
plications: rich voters oppose redistribution since they are net contributors to the transfer
system; poor voters earning below-average income would prefer a positive tax rate that
redistributes from the rich to the poor. In contrast, when voters have altruistic motives
our theory can rationalise deviations from these standard predictions. For instance, with
universal altruism the rich will consider the consumption possibilities of poor voters and
support higher tax rates, while they remain opposed to redistribution if they self-identify
in-group.
Finally, the assumptions about C(τ) ensure that V gi(τ) is strictly concave and such
that preferences over the tax rate are single-peaked. The restriction Eg ≤ 1/2 ensures
that the term ȳa(g) − EgIa(g)(y) is strictly positive and therefore any voter’s utility is
maximized at a tax rate strictly below one.16
2.3 Probabilistic voting
In this section we describe the political competition and the voting process. Two parties
1 and 2 compete for the public office and announce tax policy platforms τ1 and τ2 (with
commitment) to maximise the probability of winning the majority election. A voter j of
16For any given average income level, ȳa(g), the maximum inequality occurs when all income is in the
hands of rich group members. Suppose their share is λ∗ > 0 in the group, such that ȳa(g) = λ∗yh. Even































social group g with income yi prefers the tax policy of party 1 over party 2 if
V gi(τ1) ≥ V gi(τ2) + σj + δ,
where σj is an individual-specific ideology parameter, which has a uniform distribution
on [−1/(2φ), 1/(2φ)] and is unrelated to policy. A positive value of σj implies that voter j
is biased in favour of party 2. This distribution has probability density φ > 0. δ measures
the average popularity of party 2 relative to party 1 in the population as a whole and we
assume it has a uniform distribution on [−1/(2ψ), 1/(2ψ)] with probability density ψ > 0.
The indifferent voter is characterised by the threshold realization
σ̃gi = V gi(τ1)− V gi(τ2)− δ, (4)
thus all voters with income yi in group g with σj ≤ σ̃gi prefer party 1 over 2. Party 1’s










Since the threshold σ̃gi depends on the random variable δ the vote share is a random
variable as well. Party 1’s probability of winning the election is then










V gi(τ1)− V gi(τ2)
]
. (5)
Party 2’s winning probability is symmetric and given by P2(τ2, τ1) = 1− P1(τ1, τ2).
2.4 Political Equilibrium
In the political competition, we assume that both parties simultaneously choose the tax
policy that maximises their probability of winning the election. The resulting Nash equi-


































τ ∗1 = arg max
0≤τ1≤1
P1(τ1, τ2) (6)
τ ∗2 = arg max
0≤τ2≤1
P2(τ2, τ1). (7)
In this political equilibrium, due to the symmetry of the objectives in (6) and (7), both
parties will announce the same tax rate τ ∗1 = τ
∗
2 = τ
∗ and win the election with probability
1/2. Such policy convergence is common in models with purely office-seeking political
candidates. The following lemma characterizes the equilibrium tax rate.
Lemma 1 (Tax rate). The equilibrium tax rate τ ∗ ∈ [0, 1) is characterized by
















g(1 + Ag)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Inequality
if τ ∗ > (=) 0, (8)
where a(g) ∈ {g,U} and the equality applies if τ ∗ > 0.
Proof. In Section A.1 of the Appendix.
In the following sections we will characterize the comparative statics of the political
equilibrium when the tax rate is interior, τ ∗ > 0. In this case, since C ′(τ) is strictly
increasing and the equality applies, the equilibrium tax rate is strictly increasing with the
right-hand side of equation (8). The second term, which enters the equation negatively,
captures how concerns for the social identity groups’ status affect the political objective
function, while the third positive term is driven by inequality considerations. For instance,
higher income inequality in any social identity group, Ia(g)(y), is associated with a higher
equilibrium tax rate.
We note that an interior equilibrium results for a broad set of parameters. The equi-
librium tax rate is always strictly positive when rich voters are universally altruistic. In
such economies, the status term in (8) is smaller than one yielding a strictly positive right-































Lemma 1 clarifies the conditions that yield an interior tax rate when all groups, including
the rich voters, are in-group altruistic.
Corollary 1 (Tax rate in-group altruism). Suppose that all voters are in-group altruistic,
a(g) = g, and have the same strength of altruism, Ag = A > 0, ∀g ∈ G. Then, the
equilibrium tax rate is strictly positive and given by










Corollary 1 establishes an important benchmark, where the status term in (8) is ex-
actly one and the positive inequality term determines an interior equilibrium tax rate.
Consequently, the corollary also shows that a zero tax rate can only occur when rich vot-
ers have relatively stronger in-group altruism than poor voters. In this case, the status
term in (8) is greater than one, which is necessary to yield τ ∗ = 0.
The described political equilibrium is a standard one, but it is worthwhile to briefly
comment on some of its advantages over a median voter framework. First, the equilib-
rium tax rate is efficient, because maximising the probability of winning, given policy
convergence, is equivalent to maximising the following utilitarian social-welfare function







where the welfare weights correspond to vote shares. For instance, in the absence of
social identity, when Ag → 0, parties would propose a zero tax rate because the objective
function in (9) coincides with the preferences of a (hypothetical) voter with average income





λe,iV gi(τ)|Ag=0 = (1− τ)ȳ + [τ − C(τ)]ȳ.
This property follows from the linearity of the egoistic utility and the fact that political































utility was concave, then more equal allocations would yield higher voter support and the
political equilibrium would feature a positive tax rate even when Ag = 0. However, for
our comparative statics results, which are derived from the altruistic part of preferences,
this linearity assumption is not crucial. Furthermore, the political objective function in
(9) also yields policies that are smooth in parameters since the identity of the pivotal
voter group does not change discretely as in the median voter framework.
Second, the framework is flexible enough to incorporate multiple voter attributes and
policy dimensions. Voters’ indirect utility varies with income and ethnicity and could
be a function of multiple policy instruments (for example, public goods) as well. Lastly,
differences in the political clout or political representation across social groups could be
modelled by assuming that φ is group-specific.17
3 Social identity and redistribution
Following social identity theory, we posit that self-identification guides the altruism with
regard to the social identity group. We acknowledge that the heterogeneity of voters, and
therefore the possible patterns for self-identification, may be even richer in the data, but
for the sake of tractability we focus here on broad differences in ethnicity and income that
we find empirically most relevant. More specifically, we consider a society composed of
the poor majority, which we assume may be ethnically fragmented, and the rich elite. In
the following, we analyse in turn the role of in-group altruism, universal altruism, and
ethnic fragmentation in determining the equilibrium tax rate in such a society.
3.1 Class altruism
We consider voters composed of two social groups: the poor, p ≡ {v, w}×{l,m}, and the
rich, r ≡ {v, w} × h. Henceforth, we will refer to them as social classes and, therefore,
to voters’ in-group altruism as class altruism. As a first step, we consider social identity









hφh measures the political clout of social group g relative to the population average.































with regard to income solely. Further below, in Section 3.3, we will additionally study
the role of ethnic fragmentation among the poor for the determination of the equilibrium
tax rate.
Our first proposition establishes the comparative statics of the equilibrium tax rate
when both the poor and the rich voters are altruistic toward their own social class, i.e.,
are endowed with the indirect utility function (3) with a(g) = g.
Proposition 1 (Class altruism). Consider an economy with G = {p, r} and in-group
altruism among the poor and the rich, a(g) = g. Starting from an interior equilibrium,
the tax rate is:
(a) Strictly decreasing (increasing) in the class altruism, Ar(Ap), of the rich (poor);
(b) Stictly increasing in the inequality aversion, Ep, of the poor.
Proof. In Section A.2 of the Appendix.
The proposition establishes in part (a) that in-group altruism increases the class’s
political power and therefore reinforces the standard political conflict over income redis-
tribution: the rich support lower taxes because they value the status of their rich peers
beyond their own consumption, while the poor support higher taxes to redistribute from
the rich to all poor. In addition, the poor gain from the reduction in consumption in-
equality among all the poor due to the higher taxes.18 Part (b) of the proposition shows
that inequality aversion of the poor is positively related to redistribution. The result in
this part would also apply for Er had we assumed some income inequality among the rich.
We should stress that the vote share of a social class plays an important role in
determining the equilibrium tax rate as well, although we do not want to give this well-
understood mechanism centre stage in the form of a proposition. The marginal effects on
the equilibrium tax rate will be more pronounced the higher a social class’s vote share
in the economy. Thus, the degree of equilibrium redistribution depends not only on the
inter-class conflict but also on the vote share that each social class carries in the electorate.
18This motive for redistribution would also be present among the rich, had we assumed some income
heterogeneity among them. However, part (a) of the proposition would still apply in such a setting since
































In this section we consider the role of altruism and social identity with regard to the
population as a whole. This is often referred to as universal altruism in the literature.
Under universal altruism a social group’s utility is given by (3) with a(g) = U . The
following proposition establishes that for the rich voters the type of altruism—in-group
or universal—has important implications for the level of distribution.
Proposition 2 (Universal altruism of the rich). Consider an economy with G = {p, r},
in-group altruism of the poor, a(p) = p, and universal altruism of the rich, a(r) = U . The
tax rate of this economy is interior and higher than under class altruism of the rich.
Proof. In Section A.3 of the Appendix.
The proposition highlights that the universal altruism of the rich implies more redis-
tribution through two channels. First, the rich care about the average consumption level
of all voters and not only their own. Thus, they are less opposed to redistributive income
taxes. Second, they worry about consumption inequality in the population as a whole.
In contrast, when the rich are solely altruistic towards their social class then inequality
aversion has no role.19
Proposition 2 provides the comparative statics of the equilibrium tax rate with respect
to the rich voters’ type of altruism. As a next step, we also explore the role of the
strength of universal altruism. To this aim, we consider an economy where not only the
rich but also poor voters are universally altruistic. The following proposition establishes
the comparative statics of the tax rate in such a society.
Proposition 3 (Universal altruism). Consider an economy with G = {p, r} and universal




Ek, k 6= g ∈ {p, r}. (10)
19Proposition 2 would still apply, had we assumed some income inequality among the rich, as long as































Then, the equilibrium tax rate is always interior and:
(a) Strictly decreasing in the universal altruism, Ag, of group g for sufficiently low
inequality aversion, 0 < Eg < Ẽk;
(b) Strictly increasing in the universal altruism, Ag, of group g for sufficiently high
inequality aversion, Ẽk < Eg ≤ 1/2;
(c) Strictly increasing in the inequality aversion, Eg, of both groups.
Proof. In Section A.4 of the Appendix.
The proposition shows in parts (a) and (b) that the presence of universal altruism is not
sufficient for higher tax rates due to its interaction with inequality aversion. The concern
for consumption inequality of the focal group g has to be sufficiently high compared
to the other group k. To gain intuition for part (a), consider the special case where
the focal group has no inequality aversion, i.e., Eg → 0 and Ek > 0. Then, if Ag
increases, the political clout of group g relative to group k increases. Thus, parties will
accommodate the preferred policy of group g, who only cares about average consumption
but is not averse to inequality, and propose a lower tax rate. For part (b), consider the
opposite case where Eg > 0 and Ek → 0. Then, if Ag increases, the political clout is
shifting to group g, which is more concerned about consumption inequality relative to
average consumption compared to group k. Finally, the last part (c) of Proposition 3
highlights that the inequality aversion of both classes increases the equilibrium tax rate
under universal altruism.
An immediate corollary of Proposition 3 is that, in the intermediate case, where both
social classes have the same inequality aversion, Ep = Er, the tax rate will always be
strictly increasing in the altruism Ag for both groups, as stated in part (b) of the propo-
sition.
Corollary 2 (Universal altruism). Consider the economy with universal altruism de-
scribed in Proposition 3. Let Ep = Er, then the equilibrium tax rate is increasing in the































We consider Proposition 2 and Corollary 2 our benchmark results for equilibrium
redistribution in societies with universally altruistic voters. Both will guide our empirical
analysis in Section 4 that follows further below.
3.3 Ethnic fragmentation
As a final step, we study the role of ethnic fragmentation in our theory. We thus revisit the
economy populated by poor and rich voters, however, we now assume that the poor voters
self-identify with their income class and ethnicity. More formally, the society has three
social groups and is composed of the v-poor, vp ≡ v×{l,m}, the w-poor, wp ≡ w×{l,m},
and the rich, r. For the rich voters we assume social identity is independent of ethnicity
and they may self-identify in-class or universally.
The social structure implied by this setup has attracted a lot of attention in the
empirical literature. First, the ethnic fractionalization is much higher in the US compared
to European countries (Alesina et al., 2003) and more concentrated among the poor.
Second, social identification is stronger within than across ethnic groups in the US (Alesina
et al., 2001). This may be due to racial prejudice or the perception that ethnic minorities
could do as well as white Americans if they only tried hard enough (Lipset, 1996, p. 133).
In the following proposition, we show that the correlation between ethnicity and the
income composition has important implications for the equilibrium tax rate in fragmented
societies. Without loss of generality, let v be the ethnic minority and w the prevalent
ethnicity. Furthermore, define the share of middle-income voters among the poor of
ethnicity e as θep ≡ λe,m/λep as, and similarly θp ≡ (λv,m +λw,m)/λp is the middle-income
share among all poor voters. Then we obtain the following result.
Proposition 4 (Ethnic fragmentation). Consider an economy with ethnic fragmentation,
G = {vp, wp, r} and in-group altruism among the e-poor, a(ep) = ep. Let θp = 1/2,
θvp < 1/2 and θwp > 1/2. Starting from an interior equilibrium, the equilibrium tax rate
is strictly lower, ceteris paribus, compared to an economy without ethnic fragmentation































Proof. See Section A.5 of the Appendix.
The proposition shows that ethnic fragmentation among the poor lowers the perceived
in-group consumption inequality in both ethnic groups. For example, middle-income vot-
ers, which compose the majority among the prevalent ethnicity, become less concerned
with low-income voters as their group share increases from θp = 1/2 (without fragmen-
tation) to θwp > 1/2 (with ethnic fragmentation). The proposition is also in line with
the observation in the empirical literature that the presence of poor ethnic minorities
typically reduces the observed redistribution.20
We note that the assumptions in the proposition with regard to group’s middle-income
share are empirically relevant. In the US CPS 2019, for instance, Blacks account for 18%
of all poor households (i.e., households with income in deciles 1–6). We find that the
middle-income share among them is only 41%. Among poor white householders, who
belong to the prevalent ethnicity, a majority of 54% reports a middle income (income
deciles 4–6).21
In summary, for an economy with an income and ethnicity structure similar to the US,
our model predicts that the level of redistribution is lower when the poor are ethnically
fragmented. This mechanism for poor voters complements the role of rich voters’ class
altruism in mitigating redistribution, as we stated earlier in Propositions 1 and 2.
4 Explaining the dispersion of tax rates
In this section we provide evidence on the empirical pattern of altruism in two major
economies, the US and the EU. Through the lens of our model, we then illustrate how
voters’ altruism contributes to the observed differences in tax rates. We acknowledge,
20See, for example, Alesina et al. (1999), Alesina and La Ferrara (2000), Alesina and La Ferrara
(2005), and Lee and Roemer (2006) for the US. For Europe, see Stichnoth (2012) and Alesina et al.
(2018). Luttens and Valfort (2012) offer analyses for both Europe and the US.
21If we split poor white and non-white (Asian, Hispanic, and Black) householders, the corresponding
middle-income shares would be 54% and 46%, respectively. The middle-income share among poor black
and non-black householders (White, Asian, and Hispanic) is 41% and 53%, respectively. Thus, the































however, that multiple factors may contribute to these cross-country differences and we
cannot rule out mechanisms that are outside the scope of our model.
In our theory, the equilibrium tax rate depends on the type of voters’ altruism as well
as the composition of social groups. Two crucial model predictions are that class altruism
of the rich leads to lower equilibrium tax rates, while stronger universal altruism of the
rich, when the level of inequality aversion is comparable for social classes, yields higher
tax rates. Below we will provide empirical support for both of these predictions in survey
data for the US and the EU. In addition, we also document indirect evidence for poor
voters’ universal altruism by looking at their redistribution stance.
4.1 Altruism of the rich
We consider the WVS 6: 2010-2014 and focus on the income dimension of social identity.
To determine the income group of survey respondents we use Question V239, which asks
about the income decile of the household. The strength of altruism regarding the low-
income group is well captured by two survey questions: Question V98 asks respondents to
indicate, on a scale from 1 to 10, whether “The government should take more responsibility
to ensure everyone is provided for (1)” or “People should take more responsibility to
provide for themselves (10).” Similarly, in Question V80 respondents answer whether
“People living in poverty and need” is the World’s most serious problem. Finally, to focus
the empirical evidence on regular voters, we use Question V227, which asks respondents
whether they “always,” “usually” or “never” participate in national elections.
The WVS 6 provides direct evidence that rich American Voters are less universally
altruistic than rich European Voters. In Figure 4.1, in line with our theory, we group
voters into the poor class, whose low and middle income is below the average, and the
rich class with high income. The figure illustrates that only 19% of Rich Americans
answered to Question V98 that the government should take more responsibility ensuring
everybody is provided for (dark grey bars), while 63% support that people should take































rich European Voters the same shares are almost balanced, 37% and 38%, respectively.
This shows the higher concern for low-income groups, i.e., stronger universal altruism,
among rich Europeans compared to Americans. We also find a similar empirical pattern
of altruism in Question V80, where fewer rich Americans (52%) than Europeans (61%)
responded that people living in poverty and need is the most serious problem in the World.









































































Low income Middle income High income
US EU US EU US EU
Public 4 3 2 Private
Source: WVS 6, Question V98. Notes: The EU countries in the survey are Cyprus, Estonia,
Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. Low income is
income deciles 1–3, middle income deciles 4–6, and high income deciles 7–10. Provision
responsibility is Public (5) for V98 ∈ {1, 2, 3}, 4 for V98=4, 3 for V98 ∈ {5, 6}, 2 for
V98=7, and Private (1) if V98 ∈ {8, 9, 10}. Only respondents that always or usually vote
in national elections are considered.
Independently, Falk et al. (2018) documents in the Global Preference Survey that
the general level of altruism—which can be either of the in-group or the universal type—
in the US, Canada and Australia is 0.26 standard deviations above the world average,
while in Western Europe, it is 0.04 below the world average. Given the stronger universal
altruism of rich Europeans documented in Figure 4.1, this suggests that rich Americans’
altruism, on average, is stronger with respect to their own social class compared to rich































Europeans and stronger class altruism of rich Americans should lead to weaker preferences
for redistribution in the US compared to the EU. This redistribution stance of the rich,
as we will document below, is supported in the WVS 6 data.
4.2 Redistribution stance and altruism of the poor
Our previous discussion provides direct evidence for the empirical pattern of altruism
among the rich. For poor voters, the modest concern for low-income earners in the US
compared to the EU, as documented in Figure 4.1, could be attributed to both weaker
class altruism or stronger universal altruism among poor Americans.22 In this section, we
argue that indirect evidence for universal altruism among the poor can be gathered by
looking at their redistribution stance.
Question V96 in the WVS 6 asks respondents to indicate, on a scale from 1 to 10,
whether “Incomes should be made more equal (1)” or whether “We need larger income
differences as incentives for individual effort (10).” In Figure 2 we illustrate that among
low-income voters a solid majority of Europeans (59%, dark grey bars) support redis-
tribution, while the support among Americans is only 43%. This modest support for
redistribution, in particular among poor Americans, is at odds with in-group altruism,
under which the poor should firmly support it. Instead, under universal altruism poor
voters value the status of the rich, which can explain the modest support for redistribution
in the survey. Interestingly, the lower support for redistribution in the US compared to
the EU could not be explained by lower inequality aversion alone. Suppose Americans
had purely egoistic preferences, then poor voters in the US should unanimously support
income redistribution—and some degree of inequality aversion, in-group or in the pop-
ulation as a whole, would only reinforce it. This support for redistribution can only be
mitigated if the poor have concerns for rich voter’s average consumption, as in our formu-
lation of universal altruism.23 Of course, some poor voters may still be in-group altruistic,
22The same result occurs in Question V80, where 66% and 63% of European Voters with low and middle
income, respectively, respond that poverty is the most serious problem. In the US, the corresponding
shares amount to only 58% and 51%, respectively.
23This view is supported in Klor and Shayo (2010) who provide experimental evidence that the concern






































































































Low income Middle income High income
US EU US EU US EU
Pro 4 3 2 Contra
Source: WVS 6, Question V96. Notes: The EU countries in the survey are Cyprus, Estonia,
Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. Low income is
income deciles 1–3, middle income deciles 4–6, and high income deciles 7–10. Redistribution
stance is Pro (5) for V96 ∈ {1, 2, 3}, 4 for V96=4, 3 for V96 ∈ {5, 6}, 2 for V96=7, and
Contra (1) if V96 ∈ {8, 9, 10}. Only respondents that always or usually vote in national
elections are considered.
in which case higher ethnic fragmentation of the poor in the US may also contribute to
the observed differences in the redistribution stance.
Furthermore, Figure 2 confirms our earlier conjecture that a higher share of rich US
Voters opposes redistribution (47%, light grey bars) compared to the EU (35%). This
is consistent with our discussion in the previous section, that the stronger class altruism
(or, weaker universal altruism) of rich Americans is associated with a weaker preference
for redistribution.
with rich groups is particularly strong. A potential driver of the observed difference in the redistribution
stance could be the higher social mobility in the US, as discussed in Alesina et al. (2001). If poor
Americans expect higher income growth in the future, they are more likely to identify with the population
































Why do the tax rates vary considerably across modern democracies, such as the US and
countries of the EU? While economic mechanisms do not seem to play the major role in
the divide between the US and Europe, we find that political and behavioural differences
are an important part of the explanation. We focus our analysis on the role of altruistic
preferences in the political process. In line with social identity theory we allow altruism
to be directed to specific social groups and assume that the altruistic motive depends
positively on the identity group’s average consumption and negatively on its consumption
inequality. We then show how differences in altruism and self-identification drive the
variation in the equilibrium tax rate and the level of redistribution. Finally, we document
evidence on the pattern of altruism in survey data and show that, through the lens of our
model, the pattern is consistent with the observed differences in tax rates in the US and
the EU.
There are several possible extensions of this research that could be explored in future
work. In our framework, we have assumed that all additional heterogeneity of voters
is summarized in the ideological bias, which is orthogonal to ethnicity and income. It
would be interesting to explore self-identification along more dimensions such as age,
gender, religion, or occupation. Furthermore, we have focused the analysis on a single
policy instrument in the form of a redistributive income tax. In our probabilistic voting
framework further policy instruments such as public good provision or public debt issuance
could be introduced. This extension allows to study political conflict beyond the income
dimension, for example between left- and right-leaning voters (Müller et al., 2016), or
young and old voters (Song et al., 2012).
Another interesting avenue would be to investigate the role of the altruism in networks
on the tax rate—for example using data on local communities. Such an analysis could
use some of the elements developed in Ghiglino and Goyal (2010) and insights from the
empirical literature, as in Côté et al. (2015).































ogenously given. In a more comprehensive model, these dimensions could co-evolve and,
ultimately, their dynamics depend on the tax rate. Besley and Persson (2019) explores
this avenue in the context of identity politics and a promising line of research would be
to integrate social identity dynamics into our model.
A Mathematical Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Let z ∈ {1, 2} be an indicator for party z and µz ≥ 0 the multiplier for the
positivity constraint, τz ≥ 0. Recall that the parameter restriction, Eg ≤ 1/2, ensures
that any voter (and therefore both parties) prefer a tax rate strictly below one, so we can
ignore the upper bound, τz ≤ 1. In (6) and (7) the first-order conditions (FOCs) for a








(1 + Ag)[1− C ′(τ ∗z )]ȳ −
[
yi + Ag(ȳa(g) − EgIa(g)(y))
]]
+ µz
















The second-order condition for a global maximum is satisfied
−ψφC ′′(τ ∗z )ȳ
∑
g∈G
λg(1 + Ag) < 0,
since C ′′(·) > 0. Using that
∑
g∈G λ
gȳa(g) = ȳ, for a(g) ∈ {g,U}, the FOCs can be
rearranged to yield





















































Since (A.1) and (A.2) are symmetric and characterize the unique maximum for both
parties, it follows that τ ∗1 = τ
∗
2 = τ
∗ ∈ [0, 1) and µ1 = µ2 = µ ≥ 0. Using this in (A.1)
and (A.2) yields the characterization stated in the lemma.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The interior equilibrium tax rate with class altruism is given by









































where we used the facts that Ir(y) = 0 and ȳr = yh > ȳp. Similarly, the derivative with





















Thus, the tax rate is indeed decreasing in the altruism of the rich and increasing in the
altruism of the poor.
Next, we prove part (b): The derivative with respect to the inequality aversion of the












This completes the proof of the proposition.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Under the conditions stated in the proposition, the interior equilibrium tax rate
































τ ∗ = (C ′)
−1
(
1− ȳ + λ







where we used the fact that
∑
g∈G λ
gȳg = ȳ. To see that τ ∗ > 0, replace ȳp in (A.4) with
ȳ. In this (hypothetical) case, the function argument is already strictly positive, so it
must remain strictly positive when ȳp < ȳ is in place. This tax rate τ ∗ is strictly greater




1− ȳ + λ







since −λrAr(ȳ − ErIU(y)) > −λrAryh. Trivially, τ ∗ is also strictly greater if the equilib-
rium tax rate under class altruism of the rich is equal to zero. This completes the proof
of the proposition.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. The equilibrium tax rate with universal altruism is given by











We first prove parts (a) and (b) of the proposition: Let g 6= k ∈ {p, r}. The derivative of













































































As is formally stated in Corollary 2, this condition is always satisfied with > if both social
groups have the same income inequality aversion, Eg = Ek > 0.
Proof of part (c): It is straightforward to verify that dτ ∗/dEg > 0. This completes
the proof of the proposition.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. The equilibrium tax rate without ethnic fragmentation, when a(p) = p, can be
written as
















where a(r) ∈ {r,U} since we allow for class or universal altruism among the rich. Under
the same parameterization, the equilibrium tax rate with ethnic fragmentation among the
poor is given by
































































We now show that this inequality holds under the conditions stated in the proposition.























= 2θep(1− θep)(ym − yl),
where we use the fact that λe,l/λep = 1 − λe,m/λep = 1 − θep. Similarly, the inequality
among all the poor can be expressed as
Ip(y) = 2θp(1− θp)(ym − yl).
It is easy to verify that the inequality measure is maximal when the middle income share in
the group is 1/2, thus Ip(y) > Iep(y), ∀e ∈ {v, w} since θp = 1/2, θwp > 1/2 and θvp < 1/2.
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